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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VALERA AMUNDSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH Case No. 9588 
AND ACCIDEN'T 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
REISPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts, generally, the Statement of 
Facts contained in Appellant's Brief except that it 
desires to call to the Court's attention that in its 
answer, among other matters, the Defendant-Res-
pondent alleged. 
"Defendant is without sufficient infor-
mation on which to form an opinion as to the 
truthfulness of the allegations contained in 
paragraph 3 (paragraph 3 states that on the 
date of decedent's death as aforesaid he was 
the owner and named insured of Policy No. 
30-60990 as issued by the Defendant, and 
in which the Plaintiff was named as benefi-
ciary thereof) ~and alleges affirmatively that 
if said policy did exist Defendant has no rec-
ord thereof, Defendant's records of this date 
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having been destroyed, Defen·dant having no 
mean's by which to show that a policy was ever 
issued and if it had been issued whether it 
was in force at the time of the insured's death 
or whether p~ayment of death benefits was 
made." 
STATEMENT OF P:O'INTS 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S (RES-
PONDENT'S) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHO'ULD BE SUSTAINED. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S (RES-
PONDENT'S) M'OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
It is Respondent's position that, based upon 
the pleadings and the policy, that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and that Respondent is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law, which is a 
proper basis for granting a motion for summaty 
judgment. Frederick May & Company vs. Dunn, 
368 P. 2d. 266, Page 268. 
The insuJ'ed .as a matter of law should be chaTg-
ed with having failed to exercise due diligence in 
obtaining knozeledge of the policy and is therefore, 
uegligent ,as a matter of law. 
'The case of M~zozz vs. StarukLrd Life and Acci-
dent Insur,ance Company, 26 Utah 69, 72 P. 182, 
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upon which Appellant relies, involved a substantially 
different fact situation than is involved in the case 
before this Court. In the Munz case, the decedent's 
death took place on June 29, 1900. On February 23, 
1901, the beneficiary gave the required notice of the 
insured's death, a period of almost eight months 
later. The Court held that the eight-month interval, 
in view of the circumstances, was a reasonable in-
terval in which to submit the proof of loss. In the 
case now before the Court the elapsed period of 
time between death of the decedent and filing proof 
of loss was not eight months but thirty-three 'and a 
half years. 
In Brown vs. Accident Association, 18 Utah 
265, 55 P. 63, quoted in Munz vs. Standard Life q,nd 
Accident Insurance Company, 26 Uta:h 69, 72 P. 182, 
at page 183, the Court stated: 
''Doubtless the purpose of such condi-
tions in such a policy is to afford the insurer 
an opportunity within a re'asonable time after 
the occurrence to inquire into the cause of the 
accident and ascertain the surrounding facts 
and circumstances while fresh in the memory 
of witnesses, so as to determine whether or 
not liability under the contract exists. The 
condition in the policy requiring notice to be 
given within a specified time with full par-
ticulars of the accident operates upon the con-
tract of insurance only after the fact of the 
accident. It is a condition subsequent and 
must, therefore, receive a reasonable and lib-
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eral construction in favor of the beneficiary 
under the contract." 
Respondent 'admits that un·der the facts of the 
Munz case a reasonable and liberal construction of 
the contract was justified and the delay was justi-
fiably excused, but the delay is so grossly extended 
in the case at bar that the Court must Say as a 
matter of law that the delay was so protracted that 
prejudice to the ins~r will be presumed. In the 
Munz case the Court stated, at page 183: 
"The contr~eting p:arties doubtless in-
tended that notice and proof should be fur-
nished at the earliest practicable time after 
the happening of an accident and injury for 
which the liability would be claimed, so that 
the real facts of the oase could be ascertained 
by the insuter before time had effaced them 
from the memory of witnesses. The word 'im-
mediate' under such circumstances as are dis-
closed in this record cannot be construed as 
excluding all intervening time between the oc-
currence of the death and the giving of notice. 
It does not by any fair construction of the 
policy mean instantly, but 'immedi'ate notice' 
means notice within a reasonable time under 
all the circumstances of each particular case, 
and no doubt ordinarily, unless there are cir-
cumstances excusing delay, the notice should 
be given at once." 
In the case at bar the Respondent, as pleaded 
in i~ts Answer, has long ago destroyed its records 
of the vintage of the policy under which the Appel-
lant claims. From its own records it cannot prove or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disprove that (a) a policy issued, (b) it was in force 
at the time of the decedent's death, or (c) that the 
claim has been heretofore paid. Not only has time 
effaced the facts from any of the witnesses, but it 
is likely that n1any of the witnesses have been ef-
faced. To hold that the delay of thirty-three and a 
'half years in filing proof of loss does not bar the 
claimants as a matter of law would be 'an invita-
tion for fraud to be practiced by artful and design-
ing persons. The insurer having destroyed its files 
and records cannot dispute a prima facie case, that 
is, th'at there was a policy in force at the date of 
death and that the beneficiary did not discover the 
policy until just prior to filing proof of loss. To 
excuse the intervening delay in the instant case 
\vould be tantamount to saying that no policy of in-
surance can be drawn with limitations or conditions 
subsequent therein which will ever terminate the 
liability of the insurer, and thlat the general statutes 
of limitations set up by statute can thereby, be cir-
cumvented. This departs from the long standing 
rule that except in the case of fraud, the statute of 
limitations begins to run from the occurrence of the 
event which gives rise to the cause of action. Schmidt 
.v. Jlerchants, (N.Y.) 2 N.E. (2) 680, 104 ALR. 
~ 
This is true regardless of the time of knowledge of 
Plaintiff of such right. Golden Eagle vs. lmperator, 
93 Wash. 692, 161 P. 848. 
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Under the facts of the Munz case the ·Court at 
Page 184 stated: 
"The construction thus put upon the con-
ditions in question secures to the Defendant 
every advantage and benefit to which it is 
entitled and which was intended by the pro-
visions of the policy." 
Under the facts of the Munz case this is so. 
But under the facts of this case, the contrary hold-
ing to that of the trial court would do violence to 
every advantage and benefit to which the Defendant 
(Respondent) is entitled, and would further do vio-
lence to that which was clearly intended by the writ-
ten provisions of the policy. It would, in short, be 
writing a new contract of insurance for the Plain-
tiff, which this Court has repeatedly held it can-
,not do. The risk to the insurer would be substan-
tially increased. In the Munz case the Court stated 
a sound rule, at page 184 : 
''In such a case, under such circum-
stances, the beneficiary is not required to do 
what 'amounts to an impossibility, but must 
perform the conditions subsequent within ·a 
reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of 
the existence of the policy, or after such knowl-
edge could, by the exercise of due diligence, 
have been obtained." 
Respondent contends that as a matter of law, 
after thirty-three and a half ye'ars, the insured 
should be charged with having failed to exercise due 
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diligence to have obtained knowledge of the policy. 
The Provisions of the Policy B.ar Appellant's 
Action. 
There are four provisions in the policy which 
are pertinent to the problem. These are under the 
standard provisions. No. 4 states: 
"Written notice of injury or sickness on 
which claim m'ay be 'based must be given to 
the association within 20 days after the date 
of the accident causing such injury or within 
ten days after the commencement of disa-
bility from such sickness. In the event of ac-
cidental de.ath immediate notice thereof must 
be given to the ~association." 
The pertinent part of No. 5 reads as follows: 
"Failure to give notice within the time 
provided in this policy shall not invalidate any 
claim if it shall be shown not to have been 
reasonably possible to give such notice, and 
such notice was given as soon ··as was reason-
ably possible. 
The pertinent part of No. 14 reads as follows: 
"No action at law or in equity shall be 
brought to recover on this policy prior to the 
expiration of 60 days after proof of loss has 
been field in ·accordance with the require-
ments of this policy. Nor shall such ,action be 
bro~tgh tat .all u·nless brought lei thin two years 
from the e~1;piration of the time within which 
proof of loss is required by the policy." 
No. 15 reads: 
"If ·any time limitations of this policy 
with respect to the giving of notice of the 
,... 
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claim or furnishing proof of loss is less than 
that permitted ·by the law of the state in 
which the insured resides at the time this 
policy is issued, such limitations are hereby 
extended to agree with the minimum period 
permitted by such law." 
'The above provisions are conditions subsequent 
which cut off liability of the insurer. A fair con-
struction of them is that if immedilate notice, as re-
quired by No. 4, cannot be reasonably given that 
the notice will be acceptable if given as soon as 
reasonably possible as required by No. 5. However, 
No. 14 specifically states that no action in law or 
in equity can be brought at all unless brought with-
in two years from the expiration of the time within 
the proof of loss is required by the policy. Proof of 
loss is required immediately or as soon as is reason-
ably possible, not thirty-three and a half years later. 
In any event, No. 15 states that if at any time 
limitation in the policy is extended by the l'aw of 
the state (which is not the case in Utah) then such 
limitation in the policy is extended to ~agree with 
the minimum period permitted by such law. It is 
the position of the Respondent that under No. 15, 
in no case could the period be extended beyond the 
period of six (6) years as set forth in Section 78-12-
23, U. C. A. 1953 which is the general statute of 
limitations applicable to actions based upon written 
contracts. 
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Has the Statute of Limitations Run? If not 
Has Appellant Been Guilty of Laches? 
An important point to be considered ·here is 
whether or not prejudice can be said to have resulted 
to Respondent by reason of the delay. Appell'ant's 
Brief cites the case of Sanderson vs. Postal Life In-
surance Company of New York, 87 Fed. 2d. 58 
(CCA 10 Colorado) as authority for the contention 
that the staute of limitations does not begin to run 
until proof of loss has been filed. The Sanderson 
case supra, was discussed in the case of Navigazione 
Alta ltalia vs. Columbia Casualty Company, 256 
Fed. 2d. p·age 26, where contrary result was ob-
tained. At page 28 and 29 the Court states: 
"The arguments presented and the auth-
orities cited by Appellant such as S~anderson 
vs. Postal Life Insur~ance Company, lOth Cir-
cuit, 87 F. 2d. 58, and Standard Accident In-
surance Company vs. Alex~ander, 5th Circuit, 
103 F. 2d. 500, are wholly inlapposite, indeed 
unrelated to the facts of this case. Without 
exception the cases it relies on deal with the 
situations in which the failures to comply with 
the conditions of the policy consisted of mere 
delay in giving notice; a delay from which 
no real prejudice resulted. C. F. Young vs. 
Traveze,~s Ins~trance Comp.any, 5th Circuit, 
119 F. 2d 877 cited and relied on by Appel-
lant, which at page 880 well states the con-
trolling principal here. Pointing out that the 
vital question in notice cases is whether pre-
judice has resulted from the delay, the Court 
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concluding in a thorough discussion of that 
question said of it, 
'In its nature it was one to which the 
doctrine of prejudice vel non has peculiar 
application. There was no prejudice. The no-
tice clause was not breached.' 
Respondent here contends that as alleged in its 
Answer it is prejudice because of the great lapse of 
time. It does not have the records to defend itself. 
Suppose that a claimant contended th'at he had not 
discovered the policy until after 50 years had elaps-
ed, could any Court still s'ay that his failure to give 
notice was excused. Mere long lapse of time will 
result in prejudice. This in and of itself is suffi-
cient to establi1s·h negligence by failing to exercise 
a right. Prejudice to Respondent must be presumed. 
In the ~ase of Schanzenback vs. American Life 
Insurance Company (S. Dak.) 237 NW 737, 75 
ALR page 1501, the insured died on the 14th day 
of February, 1917. The action was commenced on 
the 27th day of September, 1926- almost 10 years 
after the death of the insured, and the Defendant, 
among other defenses, pleaded the statute of limi-
tationls. The policy con!tained a provision that: 
"No action shall be m'aintained on this 
policy unless brought within 6 years from the 
time that the beneficiary or claimant shall 
have knowledge of the death of the insured." 
The Plaintiff, as in the instant case, had knowl-
edge of the death of the insured, but sought to ex-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cuse her long delay in bringing the action on the 
ground th'at she did not know of the existence of the 
policy until the expiration of the six-year period 
fixed by the statute of limitations; that therefore, 
it was impossible for her to make proof of death 
and con1n1ence the action. The Court at page 1503 
stated: 
"Was the cause of action barre·d? The 
action was not commenced with'in the time 
limited by the policy, namely within six years 
after the death of the insured was known to 
the beneficiary. Nor within six years after 
the cau'se of action accrued fthe time l'imit 
fixed by the statutes) unless as Respondent 
contends the cause of action did not accrue 
under the terms of the policy until proof of 
death h'ad been furnished to the comp,any. A'p-
pellant urges that the proof of death is a part 
of the remedy and that the cause of action ac-
crued on the de~th of the insured. Irrespec-
tive of who may be right, both agree that 
proof of death must 'be made within 'a re'ason-
able time after dea:th where, as in this case, 
the policy does not fix a time ·limit. It cer-
tainly cannot be se1·iously contended that nine 
years after death is a reasonable time in which 
. to m'ake proof of death, not that three years 
is. It is plain that more than six years elapsed 
after a rewsonable time to make proof of death 
before this action was commenced unless the 
peculiar circumstances rendered the delay of 
more than nine years re'asonable . . . If the 
facts are such that the Respondent ought to 
have known she canndt be excused simply be-
cause she did not know. We must accept the 
11 
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verdict of the jury that she did not know. But 
that does not meet the issue. The undisputed 
facts overwhelmingly show tha:t she ought to 
have known. There is no pretext that appel-
lant was guilty of ··any fraud or concealment." 
'The Court concluded that whether the cause of 
action accrued upon the death of the insured or not 
until a reasonable time thereafter alloted to make 
proof of death, it accrued much more than six years 
prior to the commencement of the action 'and the 
cause of action was barred by the statute of limi-
tations. 
Relief in justifiable cases of the strict rule of 
law at the running of the statute of limitations re-
gardless of whether the chtimant knew of his right 
comes from equity. 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 230, page 186. 
But equity h'rus a companion doctrine known as 
laches. Historically, before there were fixed periods 
for commencement of suit, pleas in limitation were 
allowed long before there were any statutes on the 
subject. Courts applied them upon the theory of a 
fiction to the effect that after a long lapse of time 
during which the claimant made no asserti.on of 
his righ1ts the presumption was raised that the obli-
gation had been paid or discharged, and in the case 
of real estate that a conveyance had been executed 
but lost. 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 2, page 14. 
The defense of laches involved, in addition to 
mere lapse of time, circumstances from which the 
12 
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Defend'ant could be prejudiced, "or there must be 
such lapse of time that it may be reasonably sup-
posed that such prejt1dice will occur if the remedy 
is allowed". 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 5, page 15. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully states that the trial 
court's ruling granting Respondent''S Motion for 
Summary Judgment must be affirmed because (a) 
Appellant Was negligent as a matter of law because 
in exercise of reasonable care Appellant should have 
discovered the policy, (b) and Appellant failed to 
comply with written terms of the policy, and (c) 
because the statute of limitations has run, or be-
cause of prejudice through lapse of time the doc-
trine of laches defeats Appell'ant's claim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JA~liES E. FAUS'T 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
9·22 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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